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Abstract—Access control models describe frameworks that 
dictate how subjects (e.g. users) access resources. In the 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model access to 
resources is based on the role the user holds within the 
organization. RBAC is a rigid model where access control 
decisions have only two output options: Grant or Deny. 
Break The Glass (BTG) policies on the other hand are 
flexible and allow users to break or override the access 
controls in a controlled and justifiable manner. The main 
objective of this paper is to integrate BTG within the 
NIST/ANSI RBAC model in a transparent and secure way 
so that it can be adopted generically in any domain where 
unanticipated or emergency situations may occur. The new 
proposed model, called BTG-RBAC, provides a third 
decision option BTG, which grants authorized users 
permission to break the glass rather than be denied access.  
This can easily be implemented in any application without 
major changes to either the application code or the RBAC 
authorization infrastructure, apart from the decision engine. 
Finally, in order to validate the model, we discuss how the 
BTG-RBAC model is being introduced within a Portuguese 
healthcare institution where the legislation requires that 
genetic information must be accessed by a restricted group 
of healthcare professionals. These professionals, advised by 
the ethical committee, have required and asked for the 
implementation of the BTG concept in order to comply with 
the said legislation. 
Keywords-Access control model; NIST Core RBAC; Break 
The Glass; Obligations 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Access control models describe frameworks that 
dictate how subjects (e.g. users) access resources. In the 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model a set of 
controls is defined in order to determine how subjects and 
resources interact. The RBAC model allows access to 
resources based on the roles the user holds within the 
organization [1]. This model has been widely used and 
accepted to enforce access control in many domains and so 
an American standard has been created in order to 
formally define a fundamental and stable set of RBAC 
features and components [2]. Although flexible and easier 
to manage within large-scale organisations than 
discretionary access control lists, RBAC is usually a rigid 
model where access control decisions have only two 
output options: Grant or Deny. 
There are some cases when this is not enough. For 
traditional access control models there is usually the 
assumption that access permissions are known in advance, 
and that the rules have been set up correctly, but in real 
settings, errors are made and unanticipated or emergency 
situations may occur. This mandates that a more flexible 
and adaptable approach be adopted [3]. In such cases as 
these, a Break The Glass (BTG) policy can be used in 
order to break or override the access controls in a 
controlled manner (the name is BTG because it is a similar 
process to breaking the glass on a fire door or a fire alarm). 
The concept is not new, it has been studied and introduced 
in several domains [3-6]. A BTG policy should allow a 
user to override the rules stated by the access control 
manager and access what he requests, even though he was 
not previously authorized to do it. But in so doing, other 
BTG rules come into play (such as obligations to 
undertake predefined actions and enforcement of decisions 
[7]) which may monitor, record or report the user’s 
actions, thus making him responsible and oblige him to 
justify what he did. We propose to support break the glass 
policies by introducing a third option, BTG, to supplement 
the existing Grant and Deny responses in RBAC. BTG 
will be returned by the policy engine when the user is not 
currently authorized to access the resource (so Grant is not 
appropriate), but neither is he absolutely forbidden access 
to it (so Deny is not appropriate either). Instead, the BTG 
policy says that this class of users is entitled to break the 
glass if they are prepared to face the consequences for this. 
The main objective of this paper is to integrate BTG 
within the NIST RBAC model in a transparent and secure 
way so that it can be adopted generically in any domain 
where unanticipated situations may occur. We call this the 
BTG-RBAC model. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes, in more detail, the existing concepts of BTG, 
obligations, the NIST/ANSI RBAC core model, as well as 
the RBAC core model augmented with obligations. 
Section III describes our proposed enhancement of the 
obligation augmented RBAC model to include BTG (the 
BTG-RBAC model). Section IV discusses the validation 
of the proposed model as well as its future implementation 
and evaluation in a real medical environment. Section V 
concludes the paper. 
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. Break The Glass (BTG) 
Traditional access control policies are designed to be 
restrictive. The assumption is that users prefer to have 
unrestricted access to everything and so need to be 
controlled. Consequently, access control implementations 
focus mainly on avoiding security breaches and 
consequently they do not always best serve the user’s 
needs and purposes. Access control policies that are 
instead defined with maximum freedom of access and, at 
the same time, maximum user responsibility for any 
exceptional actions taken, are preferable to traditional 
ones. By maximum freedom we mean the system must 
provide mechanisms for the users to access the requested 
information at all times, whenever it is needed. By 
maximum user responsibility we mean the system must 
provide mechanisms to show the user (who takes an 
exceptional action) an alert message making him aware 
that he is trying to access information he is not authorized 
to see. This makes him responsible for what he is doing 
and all the actions he may subsequently take; the system 
must provide mechanisms to automatically notify all 
responsible parties so that the user’s actions can be 
justified afterwards to them [5]. 
As an example, an application domain where BTG is 
an essential feature is healthcare.  
According to legislation, the HIPPA act specifies the 
need for BTG [8] as is described in [6]. BTG is needed 
when normal access controls to processes are insufficient 
and an emergency access control mechanism is required. 
Examples of emergency situations that might require BTG 
could be account problems (e.g. a user has not been given 
the proper roles or permissions) or authorization problems 
(e.g. an emergency situation such as hurricane Katrina 
thrusts an individual into a role that lacks sufficient access 
rights to perform the needed actions). A similar concept is 
the one described in the NHS documentation as break the 
seal on sealed documents [9]. The idea is that patients 
have the right to seal information. They can place access 
restrictions on parts of their medical records. An email 
alert is raised when the seal is broken and a privacy officer 
investigates if the action taken was justifiable or not. 
Moving from legislation to practice, [5] presents a good 
example where BTG is needed. It describes an access 
control policy that was defined by healthcare professionals 
(mainly doctors who stated that BTG was a very important 
feature to be integrated within the policy and the system 
that was to be implemented). 
BTG is a required aspect both in terms of generic and 
theoretical as well as practical issues, so it needs to be 
integrated in a transparent and modular way in the domain 
where it is needed and within the access control policy and 
model that is developed within any information system. 
B. Related Work 
Research has been progressing in access control in 
order to integrate more flexibility and adaptability to 
access control policies. The Risk-Adaptable Access 
Control (RAdAC) model is an example that recognizes in 
some situations, the consequences to an organization of 
not sharing information might be worse than of sharing it 
[10]. The security risk has to be balanced against the 
operational need. The main difference from traditional 
models is that RAdAC provides flexibility to adapt access 
control decisions according to the situation at hand. 
Security policy grants or denies can be reversed according 
to the operational need at the time of the requested access. 
Similar work has been done in the healthcare 
environment as this also requires more dynamic 
characteristics than access control policies usually allow. 
Most existing implementations solve this issue with 
exception handling mechanisms. But this may not be 
enough for healthcare applications which often have 
special requirements that need to be better studied [11]. 
Consequently, the same researchers decided to study the 
access control requirements in healthcare by analyzing 
user access logs from systems with extensive use of 
exception-based access control [12]. They found that the 
use of exception mechanisms was quite common but was 
not the correct way to perform access control in 
healthcare. They concluded that there was a need to reduce 
the usage of exception handling mechanisms. The work on 
BTG described in this paper is one solution to this 
problem. 
Including BTG as a generic extension of access control 
models is presented in [13]. This work provides a means of 
specifying generic BTG policies using secureUML for an 
architecture that is based on java and XACML. 
C. Obligations 
Another important aspect closely related with BTG is 
obligations. Obligations are operations that are triggered 
and need to be compulsorily performed when an action is 
taken. They are duties, which are as
privileges (or permissions). So when an
performed on an object, the obligations that
with that permission are activated and pe
with the operation. In the case of RBAC au
obligation is performed when a respon
authorisation infrastructure is received a
obligations associated with the request to be
the user.  
Prior research has been undertaken whic
need for obligations either to provide for 
[14] or to require the performance of tasks a
users’ actions [15] or to coordinate authoriz
in a distributed system [16]. Policies with 
formalized where obligations can be perfor
after the user is granted the requeste
Obligations can be specified and manag
policy [17] [18].  
Obligations have been integrated int
RBAC model [7] in a transparent and sec
augmented model is capable of providing 
both Grant and Deny responses and it is t
model to use to integrate the BTG features. 
D. The ANSI Core RBAC Model 
 
1) Core RBAC Model 
The ANSI Core RBAC model consist
elements, which are the USERS, R
(operations), OBS (objects), and SESSIO
relations, which are (Fig. 1): 
• UA: User-Assignment  USERS 
many-to-many mapping user-to-rol
relation 
• PA: Permission-Assignment PRMS
many-to-many mapping permission-to-
assignment relation. 
• U-S: user_sessions (u:USERS) ? 
mapping of user u onto a set of session
• S-R: session_roles (s:SESSIONS) ?
mapping of session s onto a set of roles
• PRMS: 2(OPS x OBS), the set of permissio
Op:(p  PRMS) ? {op OPS}, th
to-operation mapping, which gives
operations associated with permission p
Ob:(p  PRMS) ? {ob OBS}, th
to-object mapping, which gives the 
associated with permission p. 
Figure 1 - The Core RBAC Model [2]. 
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The CheckAccess function ch
mapped for the current session
allocated the permission to perf
the objects ob. If such a value ex
TRUE (Grant) if not, FALSE (D
The steps to access a resource
RBAC model are (Fig. 2):  
 
1. The user sends an acce
request to the application 
2. The application contact
authenticate the user 
3. The Authn Service re
identity of the user to the appli
(If authentication fails, a reje
the application to the user an
here) 
4. The application calls the
passing the session details
and  requested object (Che
5. The RBAC engine returns
(or Deny, in which case 
from the application to t
terminates here) 
6. The application makes th
the resource 
7. The resource returns the re
8. The application returns the
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Core RBAC in
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2) Core RBAC with Obligations 
In order to augment the Core RBAC
obligations a new basic element OBLGS i
[7], which is the set of valid obligation
relation is replaced by a new relation OPR
ܱܴܲܯܵ ൌ ܴܲܯܵ ൈ 2ை஻௅ீௌ.  The PA re
replaced by a new relation, the permis
assignment relation (POA) which is define
 
ܱܲܣ ك ܱܴܲܯܵ ൈ ܴܱܮܧܵ 
 
oprm OPRMS, and oprm is 
augmented permission: oprm = (r,prm
specifies if the permission prm is gran
through oprm and is exercised by the rol
obligations oblgs must be fulfilled (Fig
describes how the RBAC model can be au
obligations on deny, but this is not explain
space limitations.  
In order to retrieve the obligations a
authorization decisions, the CheckAccess 
be enhanced to: 
 
CheckAccess:SESSIONSൈOPSൈOBSืBO
 
The possible results from CheckAccess a
 
• (FALSE, Ø)    |?   DENY access to
• (FALSE, 2OBLGS)   |?  DENY acc
AND perform Obligations on Deny
• (TRUE, Ø)    |?   GRANT access t
• (TRUE, 2OBLGS)   |?  GRANT acc
AND perform Obligations on Gran
 
The steps to access a resource by a user
RBAC augmented with obligations are
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III. THE BTG-RBAC MODE
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TABLE I – EXAMPLE OF A SIMPLE
Role Operation Ob
r1 read ob
r2 read ob
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However, there are a number of limitations with the 
simple policy model. The first limitation is the implied 
rule and its corresponding assumption that there is one 
BTG state variable for every permission assignment i.e. 
Role/Operation/Object combination. This is somewhat 
inflexible in practice, since it would not allow one role to 
break the glass on a resource and thereby grant another 
role (or indeed all roles) access to the resource (as can 
happen when the glass is broken on a hotel fire door). 
Another limitation of the simple model is that the BTG-
RBAC system does not know when or how to set the BTG 
state variable back to FALSE. A final limitation is that in 
most real life situations, when a subject does break the 
glass, one would normally want to place some obligations 
on this action, such as notify the manager, write to an audit 
trail and so on. The following section will address the 
limitations of the simple model. 
B. The Complete BTG-RBAC Model 
Addressing the limitations that were mentioned 
previously leads us to a more complex model where: new 
rules are added describing who is allowed to perform the 
OBTG(op) operation on a resource (this relaxes the enforced 
binding between the role that is allowed to break the glass 
and the role that is allowed to access the resource if the 
glass is broken); obligations are added to the OBTG(op) 
permission, allowing administrators to define arbitrary 
actions that must be performed when the glass is broken; 
the granularity of the BTG state variable can be varied 
from the fixed one state per permission assignment i.e. 
Role/Operation/Object combination; and rules can be 
added saying how the BTG state variable is reset to 
FALSE. 
An example of the more sophisticated BTG-RBAC 
model is exhibited in the policy in Table II. 
 TABLE II – EXAMPLE OF A COMPLEX BTG-RBAC POLICY. 
 
BTGi is a state variable of n dimensions over role, 
operation, object and environment i.e. BTG(r,op,ob,env) 
and will be described more fully in section III.D. Table II 
states that Role r1 is allowed to read obs1, Role r2 is 
allowed to read obs1 if the break the glass variable BTGi 
is TRUE, Role r3 is allowed to read obs1 if the break the 
glass variable BTGi is TRUE but the system must perform 
one obligation simultaneously with granting access, Role 
r2 is allowed to “break the glass” for reading obs1 but the 
system must perform three obligations if r2 does this, and 
Role r4 is allowed to set the BTGi state variable to 
FALSE. The function CheckBTGAccess will now return 
the following results augmented with obligations: 
 
CheckBTGAccess:  
SESSIONSൈOPSൈOBSืሼT,F,PBTGሽൈ2OBLGS 
 
CheckBTGAccess(s,op,ob) =  
C. Formal Definition 
Defining now formally the new relations of BTG-
RBAC from the Core RBAC model with obligations that 
was introduced in section II.D.2, we need to consider the 
set BTGS of BTG variables as defined in the previous 
subsection, the permission obligation assignment (POA) 
relation is modified to POA_BTG in the new BTG-RBAC 
model: 
ܴܲܯܵ_ܤܶܩ ൌ ܱܴܲܯܵ ൈ 2஻்ீ 
 
ܱܲܣ_ܤܶܩ ൌ ܴܲܯܵ_ܤܶܩ ൈ ܴܱܮܧܵ 
 
Again, the relation OPRMS is also used in the new 
model where: 
OPRMS OPRMS_BTG    AND     
OPRMS_BTG PRMS x BTGS x 2OBLGS 
The relation POA_BTG for the policy in Table II 
would look like: 
POA_BTG = {<r1, read, obs1, {}, {}> ; <r2, read, 
obs1, BTGi, {}> ; <r2, OBTG(read), obs1, {}, oblgs2_btg> ; 
<r3, read, obs1, BTGi, oblgs3_btg> ; <r4, resetBTG, BTGi, 
{}, {}}. 
 
Figure 4 – The BTG-RBAC Model. 
Role Operation Object BTG Obligations 
r1 read obs1   
r2 read obs1 BTGi  
r2 OBTG(read) obs1  
oblgs2_btg 
[Notify Manager; 
Write to Audit; 
Reset BTGi to FALSE 
after 30 mins] 
r3 read obs1 BTGi 
oblgs3_btg 
[Write to Audit] 
r4 resetBTG BTGi   
(GRANT, 2OBLGS) IF   there is a rule granting the user’s 
active role either the necessary 
permission, or permission if the BTGi 
state is TRUE, and the BTGi state is 
actually TRUE 
 
(PBTG) IF   there is a rule granting the user’s 
active role permission to Break the 
Glass 
 
(DENY, 2OBLGS) Otherwise 
The new architecture of the BTG-RB
presented in Fig. 4. 
D. Handling the BTG State 
Concurrently with a successful OBTG ope
the need to set the BTGi state variable to T
already set). The BTG-RBAC model is con
based as it needs to remember the state of 
variables. The writer of the BTG-RBAC pol
the dimensions of the BTGi state variables. 
based on the user’s roles, the operation, 
environmental parameters such as a time p
example of various BTGi state variables is 
III. 
TABLE III – EXAMPLE OF BTGI STATE VARI
 
Role Operation Object Env
r2 Read obs1 30
* * obs2 
* Write obs1 
 
The first BTG state variable is depend
dimensions, thus it is only applicable 
performing operation Read on object obs1
time dependent, the BTG-RBAC engine wil
create a new state variable every 30 minu
the administrator could define a differe
variable for the same role (r2) performin
operation (say Delete) on the same object in
periods. The second BTG state variab
operations by all roles on object obs2 on a 
there is a different state variable for each d
has permission to break the glass for any
obs2, it means that once this is done t
BTG(obs2) will be set to TRUE so that any 
any other break the glass permission on obs2
the glass broken for them. The third BTG s
for use by all roles with Write permission 
for all environments. If a role breaks the gl
to obs1, this will not affect any role with 
Read obs1. With the use of an n dimensio
array, BTG can be defined in a fine-grained
user can perform BTG with a combina
operations, objects and environmental param
 
Resetting the BTGi State Variables 
 
BTG state variables require a service 
each BTGi state variable to FALSE. This
automatically, semi-automatically or manu
ways are needed. Automatic resetting means
RBAC engine itself resets the BTGi sta
FALSE after a specified event has occurr
must be specified by the administrator whe
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example policy in Table II gives
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E. Steps to Perform BTG 
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BTG state is initially FALSE, are 
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authorized to 
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credentials 
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4. If the user is authenticated, the application calls 
the BTG-RBAC policy engine passing the session 
details, the requested operation and requested 
object (CheckBTGAccess): 
In the case where there is a policy rule granting 
access to the object, CheckBTGAccess returns Grant, 
so it goes to step 9; 
In the case where there is a policy rule granting OBTG 
access to the object the BTG-RBAC engine returns 
PBTG as the decision value; 
In all other cases CheckBTGAccess returns Deny and 
the request terminates here; 
5. The application can now ask the user if he/she 
wants to OBTG on that resource. If the user chooses 
to OBTG (giving a reason for it, if applicable) go to 
the next step. 
(In the case where the user chooses not to OBTG the 
original request terminates here) 
6. The application calls the BTG-RBAC policy engine 
passing the session details, the requested operation 
(OBTG(op)) and the requested object  
(CheckBTGAccess): 
The BTG-RBAC policy engine checks the policy, 
sees the operation is granted, sets the BTGi state 
variable to TRUE and returns any obligations 
associated with the OBTG(op) operation (e.g. notify a 
responsible manager, write to an audit) to the 
application along with the  GRANT response 
7. The application performs the returned obligations 
and the user is again shown the option to access the 
resource he requested and selects it. 
8. The application calls the BTG-RBAC policy engine 
passing the session details, the original requested 
operation and object (CheckBTGAccess): 
CheckBTGAccess returns Grant as the BTGi state 
variable is already set to TRUE 
9. 10 & 11 The application makes the requested 
operation to the resource that returns the results to the 
application service, which gives them to the user. 
 
Figure 5 - The BTG-RBAC interaction diagram. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF BTG IN A REAL SETTING 
This paper shows how BTG can be added to the Core 
RBAC model. The BTG-RBAC model can be easily 
implemented within a state based RBAC authorization 
infrastructure such as PERMIS [19], where the Core 
RBAC model with obligations has already been integrated 
and consolidated [7]. Since May 2009, the BTG concept 
has been implemented and is in use in a real medical 
setting in the second largest hospital in Portugal (Hospital 
S. João - HSJ) within a Virtual Electronic Patient Record 
(VEPR) [20]. This VEPR was implemented in 2004 and 
integrates an average of 3000 medical reports per day from 
11 departments and is accessed on a daily basis by 1000 
medical doctors.  
The Portuguese legislation requires that genetic 
information must be accessed by a restricted defined group 
of healthcare professionals [21]. To comply with this 
legislation, the Ethical Committee from HSJ requested the 
implementation of BTG in the VEPR to restrict access to 
genetic information within the collected reports. This was 
implemented initially in a proprietary way, without using a 
RBAC engine and before we developed the BTG-RBAC 
model, because there was an urgency to enforce the 
legislation that came out in 2005, on a system that was 
being used since 2004. From this early implementation 
experience we realised that standardising BTG through the 
BTG-RBAC model and implementing it in an application 
independent way, via a BTG-RBAC engine, would make 
the work very much quicker for all subsequent 
applications. So our next step was to add BTG to 
PERMIS, an existing RBAC engine, and define the BTG-
RBAC model that is presented here. 
Below we present some preliminary results from our 
real environment where BTG-RBAC is implemented in a 
proprietary way (Fig. 6). When a user has “break the 
glass” permission they are asked the question “Do you 
want to break the glass?” to which they can answer “Yes” 
or “No”. Table IV shows that with a few more than 3 
months’ use, BTG is a necessary tool to control who may 
access more sensitive information. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - General architecture of the EMR system showing the MAID, 
the VIZ modules and the CRep. 
 
The core of the EMR system is composed of three 
modules (VIZ – Viewing modules, MAID - Multi-Agent 
system for Integration of Data, and CRep – Central 
repository) which are presented in Fig. 6. MAID collects 
clinical reports from various hospital departments (e.g. 
DIS A and DIS B), and stores them on a central repository 
(CRep) consisting of a database holding references to 
these reports. After searching the database, the users can 
access the integrated data of a particular patient through a 
web-based interface (VIZ). When selecting a specific 
report, its content is downloaded from the central 
repository file system to the browser. This system has been 
in use since 2004 at Hospital S. João. For access control 
this system uses a simple authentication and authorization 
procedure that is stored within a database and retrieves the 
user’s profile (privileges and permissions associated with 
the role) each time he/she is successfully authenticated.  
When genetic information was added to the repository, 
support for BTG became mandatory. There was the need 
to define the genetic group (so one more role) that had 
authorization to access genetic information while all the 
other users had to perform BTG in order to access the 
same information as they were not authorized to do it in 
normal circumstances. 
The genetic group is comprised of 11 people. Table IV 
shows that in a 15 week period there were 86 authorized 
accesses to genetic information from 5 distinct users, while 
in 208 instances, 83 distinct members of staff needed to 
break the glass and gain access to that same information. 
In 177 instances, 98 distinct members of staff decided they 
did not have sufficient reason to break the glass. We know 
that in 156 instances the users answered no to the question 
of performing BTG while in 21 instances the users did not 
choose to answer the question and they probably just 
closed the browser or went to the previous window. 
This EMR system has a total of 906 users and 3274 
genetic reports stored within its repository (as of 
26/08/2009).  
TABLE IV – PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM THE BTG IMPLEMENTATION 
FOR ACCESSES BETWEEN THE 13TH MAY AND THE 26TH OF AUGUST 2009. 
 By authorized 
users  
(no need to BTG) 
After 
agreeing to 
BTG 
disclaimer 
Cancellations 
after BTG 
disclaimer 
No of 
events 
86 208 
177
(156 – The user 
said no to BTG) 
(21 – The user just 
closed the 
window) 
No of 
distinct 
users 
5 83 98 
 
We can state that in this short period of time (only 15 
weeks), and in order to enforce the legislation, we have 
already prevented 177 unauthorized accesses to genetic 
information. This more sensitive information was 
nevertheless openly available during all this time for those 
with genuine reasons to access it. Further, BTG can also 
be used to detect errors or mistakes within the policy as 
well as maintain data availability at all times, in a 
controlled and responsible way. 
In the 208 instances where staff chose to break the 
glass, they had to state the reason for wanting to do this. 
They could either type in their own reason, which 67 
people chose to do, or tick one of two preconfigured 
reasons. Table V presents the results. The first 
preconfigured reason is where staff members assert they 
are a member of a group who has access privileges, but for 
some reason they have not been granted access (37 people 
chose this reason). This is typically because of an 
administrative mistake where the user has not been 
assigned the correct role. The second preconfigured reason 
is where the users assert they should be granted access due 
to some emergency situation (104 people chose this 
reason). Remember that the user has been authenticated at 
this stage, and full audit logs are being recorded, so it is 
easy to identify which user actually broke the glass each 
time. 
TABLE V – MOST COMMON REASONS GIVEN BY THE USERS WHO 
PERFORMED BTG. 
 
Reasons to perform BTG Total 
I have urgency in seeing the requested 
information although I’m not normally allowed 
to do it 
104 
Write own reason 67 
I should belong to the group that can access 
genetic information 37 
 
The BTG concept implemented in the VEPR was done 
in a proprietary way. There is no BTG state information or 
the capability of a fine-grained definition of BTG in the 
initial implementation. This is why the implementation of 
the BTG-RBAC model in a state based RBAC engine 
described in this paper is now being implemented. It will 
help to enhance the use of BTG in our real setting and will 
provide for a more flexible and transparent way of 
controlling the need of users to access information in 
unanticipated situations, which they are not normally 
allowed to do. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a new BTG-RBAC model that 
integrates BTG features within the NIST/ANSI RBAC 
model in an easy to use, secure and responsible way. The 
system is easy to use because the BTG-RBAC engine 
supplements the grant/deny response with an additional 
“permission to BTG” response. This allows applications to 
easily converse with the user and ask them if they would 
like to break the glass. We provide two alternative ways of 
specifying policy rules for BTG-RBAC policies, according 
to either the simple BTG-RBAC model or the complete 
BTG-RBAC model. The system is secure because it 
allows the administrator to add BTG in a controlled 
manner and the effects may be monitored closely through 
the provision of various obligations. The model allows 
users to act responsibly by giving them a choice whether 
to BTG or not, when they are initially denied access. The 
BTG-RBAC model can be implemented within any 
application and it provides for a more flexible, dynamic 
and adaptable access control policy that will relate more 
closely with end users’ needs in complex settings. 
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